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Abstract
In maritime safety research, risk is assessed usually within the framework of formal safety assessment (FSA), which provides a
formal and systematic methodology to improve the safety of lives, assets, and the environment. A bespoke application of FSA to
mitigate accidents in marine seismic surveying is put forward in this paper, with the aim of improving the safety of seismic vessel
operations, within the context of developing an economically viable strategy. The work herein takes a close look at the hazards in
North Sea offshore seismic surveying, in order to identify critical risk factors, leading to marine seismic survey accidents. The
risk factors leading to undesirable events are analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. A risk matrix is introduced to screen
the identified undesirable events. Further to the screening, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is presented to investigate and analyse the
most critical risks of seismic survey operation, taking into account the lack of historical data. The obtained results show that man
overboard (MOB) event is a major risk factor in marine seismic survey operation; lack of training on safe work practice, slippery
deck as a result of rain, snow or water splash, sea state affecting human judgement, and poor communication are identified as the
critical risk contributors to the MOB event. Consequently, the risk control options are focused on the critical risk contributors for
decision-making. Lastly, suggestions for the introduction and development of the FSA methodology are highlighted for safer
marine and offshore operations in general.
Keywords Seismic vessel . Formal safety assessment . Maritime safety . Hazard identification . Risk assessment . Risk control
option . Cost-benefit assessment
1 Introduction
Despite the latest efforts to encourage the use of renewable
energy sources, the world at large still relies on crude oil and
petroleum-based products (Patel et al. 2015). The world’s
rising demand on natural oil and gas, combined with the con-
tinued exhaustion of its reserves onshore, has prompted mar-
iners inter alia to come up with a fit-for-purpose geodata ac-
quisition, engineering pragmatism, and skills to carry out off-
shore developments.
These developments have advanced beyond the immediate
continental shelf into water depths in excess of 3000 m
(Schuler 2016; OET 2016). These developments also com-
monly require the use of sophisticated seismic vessels navi-
gating about the surface of open water bodies, which let off
small explosions to create seismic waves. These waves travel
through into the earth and are reflected by subsurface forma-
tions, which then return to the surface where they are recorded
by hydrophones.
The use of a seismic vessel in offshore surveys is the first
andmain step in oil and gas exploration and production (E&P)
investment, and failure to carry out data acquisition is far too
expensive than the potential gains. As an example, in 1982,
the priciest dry hole in history was drilled in the Mukluk
region, offshore Alaska, owing to the fact that explorations
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relied on prediction rather than carrying out a seismic survey
of the area. In this futile exploration, approximately 1.5 billion
USD was spent on a fruitless operation (Westwood 2006).
Seismic vessels come in various lengths and widths,
stretching up to 100 m long and up to 40 m wide (Marine-
Insight 2011). They tow streamers, sound detectors (hydro-
phones), and other various sensor technology equipment. On
operation, seismic vessels tow streamers at a speed of 4 to 5
knots (approximately 9 km/h). At this rate, the survey vessel
could possibly cover some 216 km in a day and nearly
6500 km in 1 month. As survey sizes are not usually greater
than 200 km, the seismic vessel must turn at the end of each
line before commencing the next in a grid pattern (IAGC
2011), making its navigation more challenging than other ves-
sels (CHIRP-Maritime 2014). The seismic cables or streamers
are towed behind the survey vessel, in order to transmit seis-
mic data. The cables are spread by diverters, which can be
pictured as a type of mid-water trawl door and can extend to
over 500 m in width. It shows a schematic diagram of the
towed instruments by a seismic vessel in figure 1.
The survey activity takes place with the rest of the other
ocean activities in the area of oil field developments, namely,
intense shipping and fishing operations. This last point under-
lines a significant threat to the safety of the crew and the on-/
in-water seismic equipment (especially if the environment is
not well investigated or assessed). Rough weather conditions
have hampered huge exploration work in the past; for exam-
ple, the Royal Dutch Shell Company failed to complete their
exploration and production operation off the Alaska coast in
2015, partly because of the harsh environmental conditions
after a few years of exploration (Eilperin and Mufson 2015).
In addition to weather conditions, location, timing, and
duration of the survey can primarily affect the safety of marine
seismic operation. Offshore Nigeria, for example, has better
weather conditions compared to North Sea conditions in the
UK. Hence, two identically sized surveys in these two regions
could have significantly different durations and safety plans
(IAGC 2011).
Apart from rough weather conditions, the likelihood of
having other major hazard events in shipping such as rudder,
propeller, and associated machinery damage leading to MOB,
collision, and grounding are common and significant to ma-
rine seismic survey operations (Emmerson and Lahn 2012).
Human error as a contributing factor leading to accidents has
also largely contributed to seismic survey vessel accidents and
near misses; an example that can be highlighted is the M/S
Explorer, which sank in 2007 after reportedly striking ice in
benign conditions due to a sequence of errors caused by the
crew (JHC 2012).With the prevalence of major hazard events,
different stakeholders and national regulators are proposing
additional safety measures to reduce the high risk in marine
seismic survey operation and shipping activities in general to a
tolerable level.
This paper utilises notable risk analysis techniques such as
risk matrix and FTA in assessing the risk in marine seismic
survey operation. However, the outcome from the risk matrix
technique will be further analysed and classified using an FTA
technique. An FTA shows graphically basic causes of occur-
rence of an unwanted event (qualitatively), and estimates the
occurrence likelihood or probability (quantitatively), and
highlights the contribution of several causes leading to an
unwanted top event (Ferdous et al. 2011). An FTA can ana-
lyse risks of a complex system with little or no historical
accident data, by incorporating event probability estimates
from experts. This is evident in its application in the nuclear,
aerospace, and petrochemical industry (Suresh et al. 1996;
Yuhua and Datao 2005; Hu 2016).
1.1 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
FSA methodology is incorporated in this study in order to
achieve a reliable risk management structure. The idea of
FSA was initially established in the 1990s, after the occur-
rence of a sequence of ship accidents. The first use of the
FSA guidelines took place after the adoption of the ‘Interim
Guidelines’ (IMO 1997); shortly after, the use of FSA was
termed ‘trial application’. The trial application of FSA and
the test case of FSA for helicopter landing area (HLA) on
cruise ships did not get consensus acceptance, this, leading
to a series of amendments. The case of FSA for HLA carried
out by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) for the first time led to the
introduction of cost-benefit assessment (CBA) (Vassalos
2009), which was later accepted by the IMO and formed part
of the FSA decision-making process.
Generally, the principles of FSA include identifying haz-
ards, evaluating the risk related to the identified hazards, con-
trolling the significant risks, and making a decision centred on
CBA. The main aim of FSA methodology is the development
of a framework of safety requirements for shipping, in which
risks are tackled in an understandable and cost-effective man-
ner (Ikeagwuani and John 2013).Fig. 1 Seismic survey vessel with labelled instrument (Buchanan 2016)
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However, there are criticisms that FSA studies confuse
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ and failing to determine the root cause
of a hazard event (Psaraftis 2012); this setback was revealed
in Germany inMSC 86 (Parsons 2016). Collision and ground-
ing, fires, and explosions, for example, are the product of an
accident; if these are wrongly categorised as initiating events
in a hazard identification (HAZID) stage, the HAZID process
and, of course, the entire FSA study would be at a fault.
Hence, the entire focus of FSA being a proactive practice of
preventing and controlling risk might be invalid. Methods to
circumvent this FSA drawback have been suggested; possible
methods include the use of Bayesian network (BN) modelling
(Haapasaari et al. 2015) and the use of the human reliability
assessment (HRA) model (Redmill 2002). Another method is
also suggested which involves the use of the failure modes and
effect analysis (FMEA) and FTA technique. These both ini-
tially identify and list all the possible failures (cause) that
could happen subjectively and then make an assessment of
the consequences (effect) of each failure (Long and Hillman
2014). These techniques offer a full picture of the problem in a
wider context.
Nevertheless, the FSA process is dependent upon subjec-
tive judgement, that is, the expert(s) conducting the risk as-
sessment (IMO 2018). There exist lapses on the side of expert
utilising any method they can to justify a particular FSA por-
tion, as current FSA guidelines permit FSA expert consider-
able leeway in their choice of which FSA methodologies to
utilise (Parsons 2016). If there are no guidelines put in place to
curtail this, then the role of the entire FSA could be weakened
and arguably negated.
The use of expert judgement is considered to be an impor-
tant element within the FSA methodology (IMO 2018); how-
ever, the heavy reliance on expert’s input (Kontovas and
Psaraftis 2009) could potentially lead to a biased judgement.
This, coupled with the possibility of data manipulation, could
compromise both the FSA’s goal of being transparent and the
integrity of the whole process.
Despite these shortcomings of FSA, it on its own has gone
through critical scrutiny and has been used as a successful tool
in various projects. For example, a European Commission
project, ‘Design, Operation and Regulatory Project for
Safety’ (SAFEDOR, 2005–2009), produced a case study,
and the demonstration of an FSA study has been presented
in a published book ‘Risk-Based Ship Design’ (Papanikolaou
2016).
Since 2009, several researchers have successfully carried
out the application of FSAmethodology to different aspects of
safety in shipping while consolidating the drawbacks with
modern risk analysis techniques. Zhang et al. (2011) success-
fully applied FSA to navigational risk evaluation of the
Yangtze River. In order to improve the navigational safety
in the Yangtze River, the author estimated the navigational
risk of the Yangtze River using the FSA concept and
incorporated BN technique to address the issue of cause and
effect confusion while tackling the issue with expert judge-
ment. Vidmar and Perkovič (2018) applied FSAmethodology
in the systematic risk assessment of crude oil tankers, potential
hazards were analysed with structured methods such as
HAZID and HAZOP, and the author finalised the assessment
using event trees to decipher the confusion of cause and effect
in the application of FSA methodology. Other researchers
who addressed the issue of cause and effect and the issues
with expert judgement include Görçün and Burak (2015),
Sniegocki (2014), and Hakan et al. (2013).
Since the adoption of FSA in the 1990s and the approval in
2002, an increasing number of publications relating to FSA
applications have been published but with limited literature on
the application of the FSA methodology on marine seismic
survey vessel operation. The dovetailing of the two quantita-
tive risk analysis methods (risk matrix and FTA) with the FSA
framework as employed in this paper contributes to both the
risk analysis literature and the concerned industry. In addition
to the significance of this paper, a complex marine seismic
survey operation with dynamic risk is simplified, using the
two aforementioned quantitative risk analysis methods.
1.2 Handling Uncertainty in RiskMatrix and Fault Tree
Risk matrix and FTA require event data (frequency and con-
sequence severity for risk matrix), as input to carry out a
comprehensive quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for a pro-
cess system. This input can be categorised into two types in
the uncertainty analysis, namely, the aleatory and the episte-
mic uncertainty. The former refers to the uncertainty of input
arising from randomness due to inherent variability in the
system, while the latter refers to the uncertainty of input aris-
ing from lack of knowledge/information, such as event data
from expert judgement (Sun et al. 2018).
When input data is readily available, a probability distribu-
tion can be correctly used to represent the aleatory uncertainty,
but when input data is very scarce, a probabilistic representa-
tion of epistemic uncertainty from expert knowledge could be
misleading (Zio 2008). To overcome the probabilistic repre-
sentation of epistemic uncertainty arising from expert knowl-
edge, most researchers have in recent times incorporated
Bayesian subjective probability in their risk analysis studies.
Nevertheless, an alternative method has recently been pro-
posed that involves evidential reasoning (ER) with fuzzy sets
(Yang et al. 2018; Aven 2016) or a combination of Bayesian
network (BN) with Fuzzy ER (Yazdi and Kabir 2018). The
fuzzy sets are associated with the interval distribution of prob-
abilistic data, whose elements have degrees of membership to
represent the strength of an expert's opinion, to enlighten the
risk analyst or decision-maker. The risk analysis outcomes are
then summarised in not only risk or probability P but likewise
the pair (P,DoB), whereDoB offers some qualitative measures
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of the strength of the opinion supporting the risk
probability, P. Fuzzy set approach might offer a useful way
to solve the impression of input data regarding the fluctuation
of parameters (Alyami et al. 2019; Suresh et al. 1996).
Most risk matrix and FTA studies utilise a single value
probability estimate in risk analysis, which contradicts the
suggestions of handling input data uncertainties. However,
in the application of single value probability estimate using
the risk matrix and FTA techniques in this research, much
effort has been made in the careful selection of experts with
a reasonable wealth of experience in the subject. The careful
selection of experts offers the confidence that hazard event
data are judged with care. In the event of the non-existence
of data or incompleteness in hazard event data, experts assign
a ‘zero’ value. This idea of scoring ‘zero’ for incomplete data
has been attempted in several risk analysis and decision-
making studies such as Xu and Yang (2001) and Lee and
Yang (2017).
The above idea of utilising a single value risk probability
estimate in risk matrix and FTA has been criticised in the past,
but recently, in a marine risk assessment study, authors found
out that the calculated fuzzy risk values were consistent with
the results of a single value estimate using the risk matrix
technique (Abdussamie et al. 2018). Despite this finding, a
number of alternative representation structures to deal with
the probabilistic representation of epistemic uncertainty are
presented, but not discussed herein; they are the following:
Bayesian network (Cai et al. 2019), evidence theory
(Curcurù et al. 2012), fuzzy set theory (Komal 2015), possi-
bility theory (Roger Flage et al. 2013), and interval analysis
(Oliveira et al. 2016).
1.3 Research Hypothesis
This research is carried out in response to the assumption that
the shortage of statistical accident data poses a challenge to
analyse risks in a marine seismic survey operation. The re-
search is also carried out in response to the assumption that
operational risk control strategy in the form of training and
retraining of crew members on how to avoid accidents is not
an effective risk control measure to mitigate risks in a marine
seismic survey operation. However, the above assumptions
presented before the research enabled an opening to further
research, and hence, the initial assumptions may be overruled
in favour of a more convincing risk analysis approach and a
more practical risk control strategy. Consequently, the study’s
reproductive logic has beenmodified, and it is based finally on
the hypothesis that risk matrix and FTA techniques can ad-
dress risk by taking risk data from specialists with the first-
hand experience in marine seismic survey operation. In addi-
tion, both operational and engineering risk control strategies
have a role to play in mitigating risks of a marine seismic
survey operation.
2 Formal Safety Assessment
As described previously, FSA is a structured and systematic
methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety, including
protection of lives, marine environment, and assets, by using
risk analysis and cost-benefit evaluation. FSA can be used as a
tool to help in the evaluation of new and existing regulations
for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment
(Carlos Guedes 2010). It serves as a tool for making a com-
parison between existing and possibly improved regulations,
with a view to achieving a balance between the various tech-
nical and operational issues, including human element, and
the inherent costs in carrying out safety plans (IMO 2015a).
Any risk assessment approach to maritime safety regula-
tion is often faced with four challenges, and an effective ap-
proach should hold these in focus:
1 Systematic: the ability to be implemented using a formal
and structured process
2 Proactive: the ability to identify envisaged hazards rather
than respond after accidents have happened
3 Transparent: the ability to be clear in the safety level
achieved
4 Cost-effective: the ability to find a balance between risk
reduction and economic benefits, for the key stakeholders
of the proposed risk control measures
The FSA framework provides a platform to conform to the
above four maritime safety standards. The steps in FSA are:
1 Identification of hazards
2 Risk estimation
3 Identification of risk control options
4 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
5 Recommendation for decision-making
From the above FSA steps, a functional component in an
FSA technique is shown in Fig. 2 as presented by IACS in
MSC’s 75th session in 2002. This risk management approach
employs a risk-based technique, which looks quite similar to
the offshore QRA procedures, but the actual contents,
methods (Bai and Jin 2016), and tools of each FSA step can
be quite different (Yong and Wei-Liang 2016).
3 Risk Assessment and Management
of a Seismic Survey Vessel Operation
3.1 Preparatory Step
Before initiating the FSA process, the definition of the prob-
lem is elaborated with respect to the system, goal, and opera-
tion. The purpose of defining the problem is to access the
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problem carefully with respect to the regulations under re-
view; this in return will assist in determining the extent and
depth of the FSA application. This preparatory step is given to
all FSA applications; this is important because a misguided
definition on a system such as a vessel operation may lead to
insufficient recommendations, which in turn may eliminate
major risk categories from the system being assessed. This
step helps to simplify the goal of the assessment. The goal
of the present study will include the consideration of major
accidents that have occurred in the North Sea during a marine
seismic survey operation.
3.2 Step 1 Hazard Identification
Hazard Identification (HAZID) is a systematic process of
identifying hazards and their related events, which could give
rise to a significant consequence to personnel, environment, or
asset. The focus in HAZID is to ensure that the process is
proactive and not confined only to hazards that have
materialised in the past (IMO 2012).
This process typically consists of structured group reviews,
and experience has proved that the group of experts involved
in the HAZID can apply any technique to identify the causes
and effects of accidents and the relevant hazard events
(Loughran et al. 2002).
The expert judgement methodology, as used in this paper,
is divided into three stages:
& Choosing experts
& Elicitation
& Aggregation
The elicitation stage refers to the process of proposing
opinions or expert judgements through different means. This
is typically supplied through interviews and/or questionnaires.
The aggregation phase is the means of taking the average or
converging of the different expert opinions offered in the
study (Endrina et al. 2018).
3.2.1 List of Hazards
In many cases of identifying marine seismic survey operation
hazards and its leading events, a huge amount of information
is either incomplete or totally lacking; thus, it is often difficult
to identify all hazard events. Consequently, after a pre-
elicitation meeting with the co-authors of this study, five suf-
ficiently experienced North Seafarers and managers of marine
seismic survey companies in the UK were contacted. These
experts contributed their knowledge and opinions through
telephone interview on developing the risk matrix approach
used in this paper and determining the hazard category and
subcategory. Table 1 shows the significant hazard category in
a marine seismic survey operation.
The data sets obtained from the HAZID process related to
hazard events in a marine seismic survey vessel operation are
Fig. 2 FSA flow chart (MSC 2002)
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converted into quantitative values. In order to prioritise
the risk level of the identified hazard events, a hazard
screening process is conducted to quantify the occur-
rence and the severity of the consequences of each haz-
ard event in Table 1.
3.2.2 Hazard Screening
Risk Matrix The risk matrix approach, which prioritises haz-
ards, is used in the hazard screening process. This risk-based
technique appeals to both non-professionals and risk special-
ists to stress the uncertainty in risk statements. A risk matrix
describes risk in a graphical manner and belongs to the set of
probability consequence diagrams (Ale et al. 2015). It is used
in risk assessment to define the level of risk by considering the
category of likelihood (or probability or frequency), against
the category of consequence (or severity). Risk matrices are
globally used in risk management and often a regular feature
in different risk management standards and guidelines. Risk
matrix remains popular and often utilised in the informative
sections of several international standards such as IEC (2006)
and ISO (2010). They are also being used as formal corporate
risk acceptance criteria, and only recently, risk specialists have
highlighted some drawbacks of the risk matrix utilisation
(Duijm 2015) such as risk ties (Ni et al. 2010). Despite the
drawbacks of the risk matrix approach, Ruge (2004) depicts
how a single risk matrix technique gained the status of a cor-
porate framework, leading to a risk management decision-
making methodology throughout a large business enterprise.
Risk matrix still serves as a simple tool to increase the
viewer’s perception of risks and assist in management deci-
sion-making.
The risk matrix approach provides a traceable structure for
a clear consideration of the consequence and frequency of the
identified hazard events. This approach uses a matrix, which
divides the dimension of frequency (F) of the hazard events
and the consequence (C) into categories. F and C categories
are provided for each hazard event, in order to have a clear
evaluation.
In the risk matrix hazard screening, a five-scale dimension
is used for the frequency and consequence assignments as
shown in Tables 2 and 3.
The combination of frequency and the consequence in
Table 4 will help to provide a risk ranking number (RRN)
for each identified hazard event (Loughran et al. 2002), thus
prioritising risks according to their importance. In the risk
matrix formulation, it is logical that the discrete ‘C’ and ‘F’
categories are placed in order along the ordinates (sides) of the
risk matrix, that is, the frequency categories should be ranked
from F1 (remote) to F5 (frequent), and the consequence cate-
gory should be ranked fromC1 (negligible) toC5 (catastroph-
ic). See Table 4 for clarification.
The combination ofCn and Fn amounts to the risk estimate:
R ¼ Cn  Fn
where n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Because of the consequent shortage of statistical data of
hazard events inmarine seismic survey operation, expert opin-
ion will be relied on for the actual evaluation of the frequency
and consequence of each hazard event category given in
Table 1. See Table 5 for a summary of the experts’
background.
The Delphi method is utilised herein to obtain information
from the experts through a developed questionnaire. This
method of getting input data has also been used by several
researchers such as Nyman et al. (2010). Since there were no
huge discrepancies in the collected questionnaire results, an
integer input was recorded from their converged judgements.
Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are established to give a clear
representation of the final expert judgement for the identified
hazard event categories.
Risk levels are assessed by the RRNs ranging from 1,
which is the lowest risk level having least frequency and least
Table 1 Hazard event category
Hazard category Source
Man overboard Telephone interview
Fires and explosion Telephone interview
Loss of hull integrity Telephone interview
Collision/contact Telephone interview
Towed array entanglement Telephone interview
Heavy weather damage Telephone interview
Table 2 Frequency assignment (Lois et al., 2004)
Assigned rating If the frequency is:
1 Remote =might occur once in a lifetime
2 Occasional = might occur once every 1 to 5 years
3 Likely =might occur up to 5 times per year
4 Probable =might occur monthly or weekly
5 Frequent = might occur daily
Table 3 Consequence severity assignment (Lois et al., 2004)
Assigned rating If the impact could be:
1 Negligible = injury not requesting first- aid
2 Minor = injury requesting first-aid
3 Significant = injury requesting more than first-aid
4 Critical = severe injury
5 Catastrophic = loss of life, vessel, extreme
environmental impact
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consequence, to 9 which is the highest risk level having the
most frequent risk and the most severe consequence. Table 12
depicts the number of times each RRN appears within a haz-
ard event category. For instance, RRN 4 appears 7 times for
the MOB hazard category.
3.2.3 Equivalent Total
The RRN is considered for each hazard event category at dif-
ferent generic locations; this consideration leads to the formu-
lation of the equivalent total (ET) to give the accident category
an index number, which will later be employed to rank the
hazard event categories. The outcome of the ET will help to
determine allocation of resources to prevent or reduce the risk
associated to each hazard event. According to MSC (1997), the
ET calculation makes use of the fact that both the severity and
frequency bands of the risk matrix are approximately logarith-
mic (e.g., a risk level of 8 is treated as 104, if the risk level 4 is
used as the base). Therefore, using 4 as the base:
Man overboard ET
¼ 4þ log 7þ 20þ 400þ 2000þ 10000þ 100000ð Þ
¼ 9:05
Heavy weather damage ET ¼ 4þ log 0þ 10þ 200þ 1000ð Þ
¼ 7:08
Towed array entanglement ET
¼ 4þ log 2þ 10þ 100þ 1000þ 10000ð Þ ¼ 8:05
Contact and collision ET ¼ 4þ log 3þ 40þ 600þ 1000ð Þ
¼ 7:22
Loss of hull integrity ET ¼ 4þ log 16þ 100ð Þ ¼ 6:06
Fire ET ¼ 4þ log 6þ 300þ 2000þ 10000ð Þ ¼ 8:09
A summary of the above calculation is presented in
Table 13.
From the above hazard screening, the ‘man overboard’
hazard is seen as the most significant hazard event with an
equivalent total of 9.05 followed by ‘Fire’ (see Table 13).
Further risk estimation will prioritise ‘man overboard’,
followed by ‘fire’, ‘towed array entanglement’, ‘contact and
collision’, ‘heavy weather damage’, and lastly ‘loss of hull
integrity’. A full-scale risk estimation of all the hazard events
would be too large in volume; hence, further analysis will only
focus on the ‘man overboard’. Safety engineers can use the
preceding analysis on ‘man overboard’ as a reference to ana-
lyse other risks in other shipping operations.
3.3 Step 2 Risk Estimation
The main objective of carrying out risk estimation is to pro-
vide an explicit investigation of the causes and the conse-
quences (effect) of the most significant hazard event identified
in Table 13. The purpose of this is to give proper attention to
high-risk areas and focus on factors, which affect the level of
risk (IMO 2002).
In risk estimation, fault tree analysis (FTA) is considered
one of the most important probabilistic and logical techniques,
which operates with either expert knowledge or historical data
inputs (Ahmed Ali et al. 2013). Further analysis will involve
the application of the FTA technique.
3.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis
FTA is a safety/risk analysis technique that has been used in
handing both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment
problems. FTA is a top-down approach that systemically con-
siders the contributing events at levels below the top level
(Lavasani 2010). It is a logical reasoning approach and can
be applied to a system of any size for risk assessment purposes
(Godaliyadde et al. 2009).
FTA is constructed with ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gate logic to de-
pict the causes of failure of an event. The ‘AND’ gate is used
to connect the causes of failure of an event if the causes hap-
pen simultaneously, while the ‘OR’ gate is employed if the
Table 4 Risk matrix (Wang and Pillay 2003)
Consequences Frequency
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
C1 Negligible 1 2 3 4 5
C2 Minor 2 3 4 5 6
C3 Significant 3 4 5 6 7
C4 Critical 4 5 6 7 8
C5 Catastrophic 5 6 7 8 9
Table 5 Expert background
Expert Industry Experience
A UKmarine geophysical services company 20 years of industrial experience, charter engineer status
B UK marine geophysical service company 20 years of industrial experience, charter engineer status
C UKmarine geophysical services company 20 years of industrial experience, charter engineer status
D UKmarine geophysical services company 24 years of industrial experience, HND status
E UKmarine geophysical services company 21 years of industrial experience, HND status
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causes of failure of an event happen directly (i.e. not simulta-
neously). The logic gates determine the addition or multipli-
cation of probabilities to obtain the values for the top event
(Lavasani 2010).
A fault tree (FT) computer application can aid in carrying
out calculations in FTA, and this can be used in addressing
probabilities of event occurrence associated with risk
assessment of a system. Isograph (2015) incorporating fault
tree+ will be used to analyse the risk of MOB considering the
important initiating events.
FTA has gained popularity in the nuclear, aerospace, and
petrochemical industry in comprehending system reliability
(Yuhua and Datao 2005). FTA can analyse risks from a com-
plex system by combining expert knowledge with its use.
Although it has some drawbacks, it is also preferred over some
risk analysis techniques in the sense that it shows graphically
basic causes of occurrence of a hazard event (qualitatively),
estimates the likelihood or probability (quantitatively), and
highlights the contribution of several causation factors leading
to the top event. The graphical representation of events in FTA
appeals to both non-professionals and risk specialists.
A major setback with the application of the FTA technique
is in its inability to show or analyse the dependencies of dy-
namic events. This limitation has led to the extension of the
FTA technique with a model-based dependability analysis.
Kabir (2017) reveals a more detailed insight concerning the
working mechanism of this extension. Nevertheless, in this
research, FTA technique fits better than other techniques
mainly because it provides a logical hierarchy for analysing
the risk factors influencing marine seismic survey vessel op-
eration. The FTA technique also allows experts to understand
the relationship between their judgements to provide useful
insights when executing their hazard event probability
judgement.
Expert Judgement in the FTA Construction: a Case Study The
five experts mentioned in Section 3.2.2 and in Table 5 were
also interviewed to share their first-hand experience and pro-
vide hazard event input for the MOB FT construction of a
prospect project in the North Sea area. From the telephone
interview session, a consensus was reached: the MOB inci-
dent could occur because of human error, insufficient organi-
sation policy, or uncontrollable reasons. Human error contri-
bution could occur because of the lack of experience of a new
crew member, sea state affecting human judgement, and fa-
tigue from prolong working hours or because of poor commu-
nication. Insufficient organisation policy could occur because
of either lack of strict use of alcohol on board ship and/or lack
of training on safe work practice and/or congested workspace.
Uncontrollable reasons could be in the form of entangled in-
water cable, slip/fall, or sea state causing violent ship move-
ment. Slip/fall could occur because of a slippery deck as a
result of rain, snow or water splash, or poor lighting condi-
tions. The construction of the FT diagram also agrees to a
seismic survey MOB accident reported by IAGC (2013).
The average probabilities of the 11 basic events can be
obtained. For example, to obtain the probability of ‘slippery
deck as a result of rain, snow, or water splash’ happening
Table 6 Man overboard ranking using risk matrix table (converged expert judgement)
Accident: man overboard
Operational subcategory Crew embarking Manoeuvring (harbour) At sea (coastal) Manoeuvring in a grid pattern at sea Crew disembarking
Slippery deck F2/C2= 3 F2/C3= 4 F3/C4= 6 F5/C5= 9 F2/C2= 3
Fatigue F2/C2= 3 F2/C3= 4 F3/C4= 6 F4/C5= 8 F4/C3= 6
Corroded railing F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C3= 5 F3/C5= 7 F3/C2= 4
Breaking waves F1/C1= 1 F2/C1= 2 F4/C3= 6 F4/C4= 7 F1/C1= 1
Poor communication F2/C2= 3 F2/C3= 4 F2/C3= 4 F2/C4= 5 F2/C2= 3
Table 7 Fire ranking using risk matrix table (converged expert judgement)
Hazard: fire
Operational subcategory Crew embarking Manoeuvring (harbour) At sea (coastal) Manoeuvring in a grid pattern at sea Crew disembarking
Navigational bridge F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 3
Engine room F2/C2= 3 F2/C2= 3 F4/C4= 7 F4/C4= 8 F2/C2= 3
Storage space F2/C3= 4 F2/C3= 4 F3/C4= 6 F3/C4= 6 F1/C3= 4
Back deck F1/C1= 1 F2/C1= 2 F4/C3= 6 F4/C4= 7 F1/C1= 1
Crew accommodation F2/C2= 3 F3/C3= 4 F2/C3= 4 F2/C3= 4 F2/C2= 3
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during a seismic survey operation, the average probability
would be calculated using the subjective data provided by
the five experts and represented in Table 14. Note that some
concerns regarding the single value probability estimate
utilised in this section have been dealt with and discussed in
Section 1.2.
The average prior probabilities of the remaining 10 basic
events occurring in the North Sea per 1000 ships in a year as
provided by the five experts are presented in Table 15.
These hazard event data are recorded in the isograph com-
puter application (Isograph 2017) to analyse the risk of MOB.
With the given data from the experts, the result of the FTA is
represented in Fig. 3.
3.3.2 Results from the FTA
The minimum cut set is X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 + X6 + X7 +
X8 + X9 + X10 + X11.
Once this has been derived, the quantification of the FTA
becomes straightforward.
The results from the FTA show that the probability of the
top event occurring is 2.0 × 10−2/year, meaning on a scale of 1
to 10, the probability of having a MOB accident is ‘2’ for
every 100-ship operating in the North Sea per year. In addi-
tion, the results reveal that the lack of training on safe work
practice is the most significant basic event with a risk rank
index (RRI) of 1, followed by slippery deck as a result of rain,
snow, or water splash with RRI of 2. See Table 16 for other
basic event’s prioritisation.
The results from the FTA in Table 16 reveal that the human
factor contribution to accidents is still a major concern in the
risk management of maritime projects. Sea state in the form of
bad weather is also shown to be in the first three critical
events, and this affects seafarers/operators’ performance. Sea
state or bad weather conditions affect human performance and
influence seafarers/operators to make unwanted errors (Islam
et al. 2017).
3.3.3 FTA Results Validation
Although the process of validating an FTA result can be chal-
lenging, it is, in several cases, very important to carry out. This
process is not often tackled in textbooks or papers. Validating
a fault tree result is difficult since the quantitative outcome of
the FT is a probability, which is not at all tangible
(Stamatelatos et al. 2002). However, the FTA result can be
Table 8 Loss of hull integrity
ranking using risk matrix table
(converged expert judgement)
Hazard: loss of hull integrity
Operational
subcategory
Crew
embarking
Manoeuvring
(harbour)
At sea
(coastal)
Manoeuvring in a grid
pattern at sea
Crew
disembarking
Hull plating F3/C1= 3 F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C1= 3
Framing F3/C1= 3 F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C1= 3
Bulkheads F3/C1= 3 F3/C2= 4 F3/C2= 4 F3/C3= 5 F3/C1= 3
Welds and joints F4/C1= 4 F3/C2= 4 F4/C2= 5 F4/C2= 5 F4/C1= 4
Doors F4/C1= 4 F4/C2= 5 F4/C2= 5 F4/C3= 6 F4/C1= 4
Penetrations F5/C1= 5 F5/C1= 5 F5/C2= 6 F5/C2= 6 F5/C1= 5
Windows F4/C1= 4 F4/C1= 4 F4/C2= 5 F4/C2= 5 F4/C1= 4
Table 9 Collision/contact ranking using risk matrix table (converged expert judgement)
Hazard: collision/contact
Operational subcategory Crew embarking Manoeuvring (harbour) At sea (coastal) Manoeuvring in a grid pattern at sea Crew disembarking
Berthing F3/C2= 4
Departure F4/C2= 5
Manoeuvring F5/C2= 6 F3/C4= 6
Seismic exploration F2/C2= 3 F5/C3= 7
Entering harbour F5/C2= 4
Manoeuvring close to berth F5/C2= 6
Shutdown F4/C2= 5
Abnormal operation F4/C2= 5 F4/C2= 5 F4/C3= 6 F4/C3= 6 F4/C1= 4
Anchored F5/C2= 6
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validated at least indirectly by checking the probability of the
top event for its rationality and comparing it to results obtain-
ed for similar types of assessments that have been done in the
past. Although there is a limited marine MOB risk assessment
carried out in the past, however, the probability value estimat-
ed in this study agrees to a high degree with the yearly aver-
ages of MOB reported cases in the North Sea from 1991 to
2004 (MAIB 2005) and 2016 (MAIB 2016).
In addition to the FTA result validation, the top major basic
events leading to MOB risk have also been identified by a
report from the Government of Western Australia
Department of Commerce—as the lack of training on safe
work, slippery decks, and breaking waves (sea state)
(GWADC 2010). Similarly, SFS (2018) identified slippery
deck as a major cause of MOB accident, and Bell and
Healey (2006) similarly identified lack of work training as a
major cause of marine accidents including MOB. The afore-
mentioned reports, however, validate the application of FTA
of MOB case in this study.
3.3.4 Model Validation
A possible way to validate the FTA model is by carrying out
an authentication of the knowledge-based model.
Nevertheless, the most frequently used techniques for this
are (1) data validation; (2) validation by testing; (3) field tests;
(4) subsystem validation, and (5) sensitivity analysis
(Mokhtari et al. 2012). Among these techniques, sensitivity
analysis is a preferred option in systems relying on probability
and uncertainty management (Gonzalez and Dankel 1993;
Hoops et al. 2016).
Sensitivity analysis of the developed FTA model proposes
an analytical value judgement for the conclusions of risk or-
dering. However, two possible axioms can be used in this
paper as a mechanism to validate the FTA model, and these
axioms are based on the system of logic, which requires no
proof. In order to validate the certainty of the FTA model, the
sensitivity analysis must at least agree to the following two
axioms if the technique is reasonable and logical.
Axiom 1 A slight increase in a basic event’s subjective prior
probabilities should certainly result in a relative increase of the
top event probability value. The sensitivity of the application
of Axiom 1 is presented in Table 17.
Axiom 2 A slight decrease in a basic event’s subjective prior
probabilities should certainly result in a relative decrease in
the top event probability value. The sensitivity of the applica-
tion of Axiom 2 is also presented in Table 17.
3.4 Step 3 Risk Control Options (RCOS)
To investigate risk control options, it is necessary to first iden-
tify high-risk areas that need to be controlled (Wang and
Ruxton 1998) (Wang and Pillay 2003) and later identify the
risk reduction options otherwise known as RCOs. The pur-
pose of RCOs is to present effective and practical options
having the following stages:
Table 10 Towed array entanglement rankings using risk matrix table (converged expert judgement)
Hazard: towed array entanglement
Operational subcategory Crew embarking Manoeuvring (harbour) At sea (coastal) Manoeuvring in a grid pattern at sea Crew disembarking
Launching of equipment F3/C2= 4 F4/C3= 6
Seismic full exploration F3/C2= 4 F5/C4= 8
Retrieving seismic equipment F4/C2= 5 F4/C4= 7
Table 11 Heavy weather damage ranking using risk matrix table (converged expert judgement)
Hazard: heavy weather damage
Operational subcategory Crew embarking Manoeuvring (harbour) At sea (coastal) Manoeuvring in a grid pattern at sea Crew disembarking
Berthing F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1
Departure F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1
Manoeuvring F2/C1= 2
Seismic exploration F2/C2= 6 F4/C4= 7
Entering harbour F1/C2= 2
Abnormal operation F1/C1= 1 F2/C2= 3 F3/C3= 5 F4/C3= 6 F1/C1= 1
Anchored F1/C1= 1 F1/C1= 1
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I Targeting areas having high risks
J Identifying possible risk control measures
The expert opinions are summed up here to deduce
methods of mitigating the probability of occurrence and/or
the consequence of the top event. The options in controlling
the most significant basic events to a tolerable limit are done
with all or a combination of the methods below with reference
to the work of Wang and Pillay (2003).
I Management activities – related to the smooth running of
an organisation that helps to develop a safety culture
J Operational strategy – involving the introduction of appro-
priate procedure to perform risk critical tasks and also im-
proving the skills of personnel involved in the operation of
the system by training and retraining them to observe safe
working ethics, contingency plans, etc.
K Engineering strategy – involving the design and construc-
tion of a ship and its equipment or activities related to the
installation of new facilities or devices, to reduce or elim-
inate hazards after vessel design
The RCOs identified in mitigating the MOB basic events is
further described and weighed in the following section.
3.5 Step 4 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
The selected RCO must be attractive in terms of cost-effec-
tiveness, so that gain can outweigh the financial loss incurred
from the implementation (IMO 2015b). In estimating cost-
benefits, an equivalent of a typical value of human life accord-
ing to ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality) used by the
offshore industry is assumed to be £2 000 000 (IMO 2015b).
This ICAF value is contained in Annex D of the first revision
of NORSOK standard Z-013 (Skjong et al. 2007), developed
for the Norwegian offshore region. Though this assumption is
believed to be void in the second and current revision of the
standard annex, the approach to environmental risk accep-
tance criteria is nevertheless believed to still be relevant
(Skjong et al. 2007).
3.5.1 CBA Calculation
The most important basic events selected from the FTA result
are:
& Lack of training on safe work practice
& Slippery deck as a result of rain, snow, or water splash
& Sea state affecting human judgement
& Poor communication
Engineering preventive strategy as option 1 is chosen to mit-
igate a MOB accident/incident. This method covers the provi-
sion of slip-resistant flooring on board, retrofitted railings, con-
structing appropriate drainage, keeping working areas (especial-
ly back deck and walkways) well lit, using anti-skid adhesive
tape in work areas, and selecting proper footwear during work.
Engineering preventive strategymight onlymitigate the effect of
‘slippery deck as a result of rain, snow, or water splash’.
Operational strategy as option 2 is chosen to mitigate a
MOB accident/incident. This method covers training and
retraining of staff to improve their communication skills such
as spoken English language and their safe work practices in-
cluding how to work safely in bad weather conditions. This
method might only mitigate the chance of having ‘poor com-
munication’, ‘the effect of sea state affecting human
Table 12 Number of occurrences
of each ranking score (six
accident categories)
RRN No. of occurrence for hazard category
Man
overboard
Heavy weather
damage
Towed array
entanglement
Contact and
collision
Loss of hull
integrity
Fire
4 7 – 2 3 16 6
5 2 1 1 4 10 –
6 4 2 1 6 – 3
7 2 1 1 1 – 2
8 1 – 1 – – 1
9 1 – – – – –
Table 13 Equivalent total
Hazard
category
Man
overboard
Heavy weather
damage
Towed array
entanglement
Contact and
collision
Loss of hull
integrity
Fire
Equivalent
total
9.05 7.08 8.05 7.22 6.06 8.09
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judgement’, and the effect of having ‘lack of training on safe
work practice’.
For demonstrating the applicability of the CBA calcula-
tion, assumptions will be made on the cost of introducing
engineering and operational strategies on the vessel per
year to mitigate the risk of having the four (4) most impor-
tant basic events selected from the FTA result. Logically,
engineering strategy is assumed not to have any effect on
reducing lack of training on safe work practice, sea state
affecting human judgement, and poor communication.
While operation strategy is assumed not to have any effect
on reducing the slippery deck, the actual time spent to train
crew and to install retrofit equipment is not considered in
this paper, as it is only a simple demonstration of CBA
calculation. The inflation rate is also not considered since
the risk assessment demonstrated is calculated per year.
Engineering Strategy for RCO1 The amount spent to ensure
that there is no slippery deck is assumed to be £8500. This
amount covers all expenses to supply slip-resistant flooring on
board, constructing appropriate drainage, keeping working
areas especially back deck and walkways well lit, using anti-
skid adhesive tape in work areas, and selecting proper foot-
wear for 30 crew members. The application of engineering
strategy (RCO1) means adjusting the probability of slippery
deck to a near zero value. Upon re-running the FTA computer
application, the probability of having a MOB accident was
reduced to 1.45 × 10−2/year.
Therefore, the top event happened at a probability of 2.0 ×
10−2/year. With the introduction of RCO1, the occurrence
probability of the top event is reduced to 1.45 × 10−2/year.
Reduction
¼ 2:0 10−2−1:45 10−2=year ¼ 0:0055
Cost that would be incurred if top event happened
¼ £2 000 000
Benefit derived
¼ £2 000 000 0:0055 ¼ £11 000
Cost of RCO1
¼ £8500
By comparing the cost of RCO1 with the benefit derived, it
shows that RCO1 is effective.
Table 14 A sample of the
subjective data utilised in
analysing the risk of MOB in the
North Sea
Basic event Expert Probability of a basic event happening per 1000 ships in a
year (probability scale = 0–10)
Slippery deck as a result of rain,
snow, or water splash
A 3.35
B 6
C 3.5
D 5
E 4.65
Average prior probability 4.5 or 4.5×10−3
Table 15 Expert judgement of
the probability of basic events Cut set
abbreviation
Basic event Probability of a basic event happening
per 1000 ships in a year (probability
scale = 0–10)
X1 Lack of experience of a new crew member 2.5×10−5
X2 Sea state affecting human judgement 1.5×10−3
X3 Fatigue from prolong working hours 3.0×10−4
X4 Poor communication 5.0×10−4
X5 Lack of strict use of alcohol on board ship 8.0×10−4
X6 Lack of training on safe work practice 9.0×10−3
X7 Congested workspace 2.5×10−5
X8 Entangled in-water cable 9.0×10−4
X9 Slippery deck as a result of rain, snow or
water splash
4.5×10−3
X10 Poor lighting facilities 9.0×10−4
X11 Sea state causing violent ship movement 1.7×10−3
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The Operational Strategy for RCO2 To mitigate the risk of
having unsafe working practices, sea state affecting human
judgement, and poor communication, proper training of staff
will be carried out in order for them to communicate properly,
to react appropriately to rough weather conditions, and to
perform risk critical tasks safely. Here, 30 seismic crew mem-
bers are budgeted to be trained, and the cost to train all con-
cerned personnel is calculated to be £7000. The application of
operational strategy (RCO2) means adjusting the probability
of lack of training on safe work practice, sea state affecting
human judgement, and poor communication to a near zero
value. Upon re-running the FTA computer application, the
probability of having MOB hazard was reduced to 1.40 ×
10−2/year.
Therefore, the top event happened at a probability of 2.0 ×
10−2/year. With the introduction of RCO2, the occurrence
probability of top event reduced to 1.40 × 10−2/year.
Reduction
¼ 2:0 10−2−1:40 10−2=year ¼ 0:006
Cost that would be incurred if top event happened
¼ £2 000 000
Benef it derived
¼ £2 000 000 0:006 ¼ £12 000
Fig. 3 Fault tree analysis of man overboard
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Cost of RCO2
¼ £7000
By comparing the cost of RCO2 with the benefit derived, it
shows that RCO2 is also cost-effective.
From the CBA calculation, RCO2 is more cost-effective
than RCO1; this information will be passed onto decision-
makers to make the final decision to assess the effectiveness
of the RCOs as it improves safety in the system under
investigation.
Note that the £2 million estimated costs of human life
(IMO 2015b) may vary; hence, the variation might affect the
above CBA calculation.
3.6 Step 5 Decision-Making
Decision-making is carried out to select the most cost-
effective RCO, which truly addresses the most effective way
to improve safety, taking assessment back from step 1 to step
4.
From the RCOs and CBA calculation, it is revealed that the
application of RCO2 reduced the top event probability by
nearly 40% (i.e. from 2.0 × 10−2 to 1.40 × 10−2 /year), and
the benefit derived was more cost-effective compared to
RCO1. Hence, the decision of training of the 30 crew mem-
bers in order for them to communicate properly, to react ap-
propriately to rough weather conditions, and to perform risk
critical tasks safely is the preferred option for the decision-
maker to enforce to ensure that risk level of marine seismic
survey operation is reduced to as low as reasonably practica-
ble (ALARP) levels.
4 Discussion
Risk matrix and FTA have been selected in this study to eval-
uate the risk of a marine seismic survey operation. These two
notable techniques have been selected in a complementary
manner simply because they both provide a quick method to
graphically recognise the risks of the marine seismic survey
operation. The lack of thoroughness is a major concern in a
risk matrix, and this is because if the tool is employed as the
only method of risk evaluation, the complexities of the hazard
event could be oversimplified. Both the risk matrix and FTA
techniques used in this paper incorporated single value failure
inputs from the expert judgement in analysing the risks in the
studied area. In handling the imprecision of data arising from
expert opinion in the application of the risk matrix and FTA in
this research, efforts have made in the careful selection of
experts with a reasonable wealth of experience in the subject
(marine seismic survey vessel operation). The exclusion of
fuzzy set methodology in this research does not necessarily
contradict the effectiveness of the traditional single value
probability estimation in risk matrix and FTA techniques, as
they are still very much effective and in use presently. It is
noteworthy that Abdussamie et al. (2018) compared the cal-
culated fuzzy risk values with a single value estimate in a risk
Table 16 Basic event
prioritisation Cut set
abbreviation
Meaning Importance [(Fussell-Vasley
(1 year)]
Risk rank index
(RRI)
X1 Lack of experience of a new crew
member
0.0106 10
X2 Sea state affecting human judgement 0.6452 3
X3 Fatigue from prolong working hours 0.1290 7
X4 Poor communication 0.2151 4
X5 Lack of strict use of alcohol on board ship 0.0814 9
X6 Lack of training on safe work practice 0.9160 1
X7 Congested workspace 0.00255 11
X8 Entangled in-water cable 0.1120 8
X9 Slippery deck as a result of rain, snow or
water splash
0.8330 2
X10 Poor lighting facilities 0.1667 6
X11 Sea state causing violent ship movement 0.2126 5
Table 17 Model validation
Change in prior probability Top event (MOB) probability value
No change 2.0 × 10−2
20% increase in the prior probability of X6 2.15 × 10−2
20% decrease in the prior probability of X6 1.85 × 10−2
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matrix assessment study and found consistency between the
calculated fuzzy risk estimate and a single probability value
risk estimate.
FTA has many computer aids, and a large number of safety
engineers use these widely. One of the major advantages of
the method is the complementary data delivered from the
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the FT. However, the
key weakness of the classical FTA technique is in its inability
to model the dynamic behaviour of a process system
(Kalantarnia et al. 2009). To overcome this, Bucci et al.
(2008) recently presented a methodology that uses Markov
modelling to construct dynamic FT and tackled the key weak-
ness with the classical FTA.
Computer aids is gradually replacing human calculations in
most risk assessment studies—with a high likelihood of error
in manual calculations—possibly rendering the whole risk
assessment studies void. However, the use of a computer soft-
ware application should practically eliminate human calcula-
tion errors.
Errors made by humans are responsible for over 70% of
most marine accidents (Anyanwu and Okoroji 2014). To this
concern, the IMO guidelines recommend the application of
human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART),
to address the problem of human error especially with regard
to quantitative risk analysis of marine and offshore operations
(Islam et al. 2017).
5 Recommendation for Further Research
This paper has revealed the efficacy of the application of the
risk matrix and FTA to mitigate risk in marine seismic survey
operations. The former revealed that MOB when compared
with other hazard events is a major risk factor in marine seis-
mic survey operation. The latter represented and analysed the
significant basic events that could lead to the MOB accident.
Lack of training on safe work practice; slippery deck as a
result of rain, snow, or water splash; sea state affecting human
judgement and poor communication were the top significant
risk factors leading to a MOB incident.
With the poor record of accidents and ‘nearmisses’ cases in
the marine seismic survey sector, an attempt was made to
compare the probability of the studied MOB case with a
real-life report. The comparison reached coincided with the
yearly averages of MOB reported cases in the North Sea from
1991 to 2004 (MAIB 2005) and 2016 (MAIB 2016).
The best RCO to minimise the four most critical risk
factors in this research was analysed against its cost and
benefit. The decision to provide proper training for the
30 crew members in order for them to communicate
properly, to react appropriately to rough weather condi-
tions, and to perform risk critical tasks safely was iden-
tified as the most cost-effective RCO.
The final decision that represents the FSA last step has
proved a traceable and justifiable means to minimise the risk
of the MOB incident in marine seismic survey operation.
Hence, the application of FSA guidelines in identifying haz-
ards and analysing the risk associated with the identified haz-
ards and the risk control options alongside the CBA calcula-
tion has proved to be:
& Systematic
& Proactive
& Transparent
& Cost-effective
It is revealed from this study that human element contrib-
utes greatly to the MOB case study. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the human factors’ contribution to marine acci-
dents is still a major concern in the maritime industry. The
best way to reduce the number of incidents/accidents is with
proactive safety culture in place, highlighting safety and pro-
viding preventative measures. Training and retraining of the
crew members is an effective preventive measure to mitigate
incidents/accidents.
With the relentless demand for offshore hydrocarbon re-
sources, it is possible that in years to come, there will be
increased activities and traffic in the offshore environment
leading to new risks; with this prediction, the marine seismic
survey companies presently should focus more on human re-
sources and enhancing training to crew members. The mari-
time industry will need to open doors to training opportunities
and more recruitment, in order to boost confidence in marine
and offshore operations.
The main limitation of this research is the fact that expert
judgement was solely relied upon. Here, there is a lack of
formal quantification or rating of expert opinion, and a case
can be cited when an expert might overlook a safety aspect of
a system under review, while other experts from a different
background might not overlook such safety aspects; this con-
fusion might result in a deadlock. To narrow the disagreement
between expert judgements from different backgrounds, a
mathematical evaluation such as ‘consistency ratio’ could be
incorporated in further study. However, from the question-
naires received in this study, there was no much disagreement
between the expert’s judgement.
The CBA technique as demonstrated in this study utilised
fictitious values instead of real-life values; however, it should
be noted that the CBA technique, as adopted for use in FSA, is
not an exact science, and it should only be taken as a means to
provide a guide in risk management decision-making process.
Further research will focus on case studies that are more
practical.
The extension of FTA and evidence theory-based formula-
tions such as fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) and BN for-
mulations, addressing the issue of uncertainties in hazard data
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and the lack of interdependencies of dynamic hazard events,
not previously addressed in the application of FTA technique
will further be looked into, in future research. Nevertheless,
this article is of an explorative nature; further research will be
required to address data uncertainty and event dependencies in
the risk analysis context.
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